Bilawal calls for int’l convention against ‘weaponisation of waterways’, says it threatens global peace | The Express Tribune

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari on Tuesday called for a new international convention against the “weaponisation of waterways”, arguing that India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance was not simply a bilateral dispute but a challenge to international law, global peace and the rights of downstream states.

Addressing the session of the international seminar, The Indus Waters Treaty: A Key Instrument for Peace and Regional Stability, at the Jinnah Convention Centre in Islamabad, Bilawal urged Pakistan to pursue its legal, diplomatic, humanitarian, climate and deterrence cases simultaneously, while warning that attempts to manipulate shared rivers should be treated as a form of coercion rather than a technical disagreement.

Bilawal broadened the discussion beyond South Asia, arguing that water coercion should be recognised internationally as a distinct form of aggression. He proposed what he described as “a new international convention against the weaponisation of waterways”, saying international law should explicitly prohibit states from exploiting civilian dependence on shared rivers.

The convention, he said, should establish that no upstream state could hold downstream populations hostage, that waterways could not be used as instruments of coercion or blackmail, and that “water is not a weapon”, “thirst is not diplomacy”, and “famine is not statecraft”.

He argued that the principle should apply globally, citing waterways including the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Nile, the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Indus, arguing that waterways sustaining civilian populations and international stability “cannot be turned into weapons of coercion”.

Bilawal also urged Pakistan to continue making its case internationally.

“We must take the climate case to every summit. We must take the diplomatic case to every capital,” he said, adding that Pakistan should also present “the deterrence case to every strategist who thinks South Asia can survive casual experiments with the Indus”.

Turning to domestic policy, he said Pakistan must strengthen water security regardless of India’s actions. Projects already approved before India’s unilateral move, including reservoirs, barrages, canals and flood protection systems, should continue, he said, because “Pakistan needs water security”.

“We are strengthening Pakistan because we have a duty to survive,” Bilawal said.

He also argued that the dispute formed part of a wider campaign against Pakistan, alongside border tensions, proxy violence, propaganda, economic pressure and hybrid warfare. “A bullet is not the only weapon. A blockade is a weapon. A sanction can be a weapon. A lie can be a weapon. A proxy can be a weapon.”

“A river can be made into a weapon.”

Bilawal compared the strategic significance of the Indus River to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that regional peace depended on preserving both. “And no peace can be achieved between the United States and Iran with the Strait of Hormuz shut,” he said. “Similarly, how can any ceasefire between India and Pakistan hope to endure without the IWT being restored?”

“A strait may carry the oil of nations,” he added, “the Indus carries the life of nations.”

He argued that the treaty had never been merely a mechanism for sharing water, but a cornerstone of peace between India and Pakistan. According to Bilawal, the agreement represented the principle that shared rivers could not be “left to the mercy of anger”, warning that allowing a state to unilaterally suspend a binding international agreement would weaken confidence in treaties worldwide.

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Bilawal repeatedly stressed that the debate extended far beyond water management. “This is not a technical dispute. This is not a clerical quarrel between commissioners. This is not engineering,” he said. “This is the weaponisation of water.”

He described the Indus as central to Pakistan’s identity and survival, saying it was “not a river on a map” but the source of the country’s food security, agriculture and livelihoods. “It is our bread. It is our cotton. It is our wheat. It is our farmer at dawn. It is our mother drawing water. It is our children eating roti. It is our worker in the mill,” he said, adding, “To cut the Indus is not to pressure a government. It is to threaten a people.”

Much of Bilawal’s address focused on deterrence and how Pakistan should respond to any attempts to alter the flow of water guaranteed under the treaty. He argued that deterrence should begin long before water was actually diverted, saying Pakistan should not wait “until the last drop has vanished” before recognising a threat.

“Pakistan’s deterrence does not begin when the last drop has vanished,” he said. “Deterrence begins when the adversary first moves towards the strangulation of a nation.”

He argued that every stage of any effort to alter Pakistan’s water supply — including surveys, tenders, canals, dams, diversions and what he described as the “legal fiction” of placing the treaty in abeyance — should be viewed as part of a process of strategic escalation rather than isolated administrative measures.

“If total water denial is an existential threat, then the path towards total water denial is not innocent,” he said.

Drawing an analogy, he said that a noose does not become dangerous only when the neck is broken, “it becomes dangerous when it is tied.”

Bilawal maintained that Pakistan sought peace but rejected suggestions that restraint meant accepting pressure over its water rights. “We seek restraint, but not national suicide.”

He argued that attempts to control Pakistan’s water should be understood as strategic coercion rather than disputes over engineering or irrigation. “We are not discussing canals. We are discussing the deliberate manufacture of famine, migration, economic collapse and national paralysis.”

He warned that “a weaponised river can destroy a country in slow motion”, arguing that the consequences of disrupting water supplies would extend far beyond agriculture.

Bilawal also called on Pakistan to combine diplomacy with national preparedness. “Law without power is a petition. Power without law is chaos. We need both,” he said.

He urged the country to simultaneously pursue “the legal case, the diplomatic case, the humanitarian case, the climate case, and the deterrence case”, while calling for greater national unity. “The Indus belongs to the farmer of Sindh, the grower of Punjab, the worker of Karachi, the family of Balochistan, the mountains of Pakhtunkhwa, and the future of every Pakistani child.”

He said Pakistan should continue investing in reservoirs, dams, barrages, flood management systems and water conservation, but emphasised that such measures should not be interpreted as accepting India’s position.

“We preserve water because our future demands wisdom, not because we accept blackmail. We prepare for scarcity, but we do not legitimise strangulation.”

Calling for political consensus, Bilawal said the Indus transcended party politics and provincial interests. He contended that “the Indus belongs to Pakistan. It belongs to history,” he said, urging “unity in parliament”, “clarity at GHQ”, “resolve in the foreign office, science in our universities”, and “discipline in our people”.

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Concluding his address, Bilawal warned the international community against dismissing the issue as an administrative disagreement over water management, stating that the Indus was not only “an artery of Pakistan’s economy” but the “bloodstream of Pakistan itself.”

He ended by saying the river was older than both the flags of India and Pakistan, a witness to empires that have come and gone, “the river remains. Pakistan will remain.”

“The Indus is not negotiable. The Sindhu is not for surrender.”

The Indus Waters Treaty

After years of negotiations, facilitated by the World Bank, the IWT was signed in September 1960 by then-Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru and former Pakistani President Ayub Khan. India was given control over the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—while Pakistan was assigned control over the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. According to the treaty, India is legally bound to allow the waters of the western rivers to flow into Pakistan, with only a few exceptions.

According to the treaty, Pakistan has unrestricted use of these rivers, while India is permitted to construct hydroelectric facilities on them under specific conditions. These projects must conform to design constraints outlined in the treaty’s annexures, ensuring that they are “run-of-the-river” and do not significantly alter water flow or storage to Pakistan’s detriment.

Pakistan, which receives roughly 80 per cent of the water in the Indus river system, relies heavily on these rivers. Of the 16.8 crore acre-feet of water in the system, India is allocated around 3.3 crore acre-feet. At present, India uses slightly more than 90 per cent of its permitted share, leaving Pakistan deeply dependent on the remainder.

This dependence is profound. The Indus river network—comprising the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—forms the backbone of Pakistan’s agricultural sector. It sustains a population of tens of millions, fulfilling 23 per cent of the country’s agricultural water needs and directly supporting nearly 68 per cent of rural livelihoods. Any disruption to this supply could trigger widespread consequences: reduced crop yields, food insecurity, and further economic instability, particularly in regions already burdened by poverty and an ongoing financial crisis.

Compounding the issue is Pakistan’s limited water storage capacity. Major dams such as Mangla and Tarbela have a combined live storage of just 14.4 million acre-feet (MAF)—a mere 10 per cent of the country’s annual entitlement under the treaty. In times of reduced water flow or seasonal variability, this shortfall in storage leaves Pakistan acutely vulnerable.

Despite Pakistan’s heavy reliance on the Indus waters, the treaty does afford India certain rights. It allows the development of 13.4 lakh acres of irrigation in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. However, as of now, only 6.42 lakh acres are being irrigated in these Union Territories. Furthermore, the treaty permits India to store up to 3.60 million acre-feet of water from the western rivers—although little to no such storage infrastructure currently exists in Jammu and Kashmir.

Relations between the two nations took a marked downturn after India revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomy in 2019, followed by the Pahalgam attack in 2025. Since then, trust between New Delhi and Islamabad has eroded further.

Early June this year, Indian Minister of Water Chandrakant Raghunath Patil told the media that India was strategising the disruption of Indus River flow into Pakistan – an action backed by PM Narendra Modi.

“It is certain, not a single drop of water will go (to Pakistan) in the coming years,” the Indian minister had told ANI news agency.

Meanwhile, Pakistan had warned the Modi-led government against any such measures.